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The National Product and Its Composition
As SUGGESTED in the preceding chapter, the size and composi-
tion of the national product will have an important bearing
on the economic sacrifices the American people will unavoid-
ably make during the war. More specifically, these sacrifices
will tend to vary inversely with the volume of the particular
goods and services available for civilian consumption after
military requirements have been satisfied.
In this chapter we first give some estimates of the gross na-
tional product as a whole, discussing both the near-term
probabilities and the approximate maximum level that can
reasonably be expected. We then analyze the volume of the
goods and services likely to be available for civilian consump-
tion under the exigencies of war and at the expected levels of
the gross national product. Finally, we indicate the kinds and
amounts of the particular goods and services which will prob-
ably have to be diverted from civilian use in order to provide
adequate resources for our military needs.
1 OUTLOOK FOR THE NATIONAL PRODUCT
A significant fact, from the standpoint of estimating the
probable future level of the gross national product, is that
previous increases in it, in constant dollars, reflected roughly
proportionate gains in the number employed. Thus, during
the most recent period of rising income, 1933—40, the addi-
tion of one million workers to the total employed accompa-
nied a rise in the gross national product of about billion
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on the average,' while during i 938—40 the increment per
million workers added wasbillion.
As already pointed out, the gross national product rose
rapidly during the early stages of the defense program. For
the year ended December 31,1941, itapproximated $i13.5
billion,a gain of $20 billion over the twelve months ended
June 30, 1940. Accompanying an average gain in employ-
ment of about 4 million workers, it amounted to an incre-
ment ofbillionper million workers added, or about 25
per cent above the average relationship for 1933—40, $3.9
billion per million workers, and exactly equal to the rela-
tionship shown for the shorter period, 1938—40.
As long as we can continue to employ additional workers,
we can hope for further gains in the national product. Ex-
cept for the possibilities of increasing total output by im-
proving industrial efficiency and lengthening the work week,
the maximum level of the national product during the war
will have been reached when our total labor force is em-
ployed. This maximum level may be estimated by ascertain-
ing, first, the total additional labor force available for em-
ployment during 1942 and 1943, and second, the probable
rate of increase in the national product as these additional
workers are absorbed into industry.
In estimating the additional labor force that may be ab-
sorbed during the war, we must recognize at the outset that
data on unemployment are notoriously bad. For example,
in the spring of 1940, just before the defense program was
launched, estimates ranged from 8 million to i 1.5 million.2
Careful study leads us to believe that the total unemployed
at the start of the defense program may reasonably be placed
at 8.5 million.
From June 1940 through December 1941 approximately
4.5 million workers went into industry and about 1.5million
into the armed forces. Offsetting this drain on our labor
supply of about 6 million, 900thousandwere added from
the natural growth of population and approximately 6oo30 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
thousand were drawn from self-employment and home em-
ployment. Making these additions and subtractions, we
estimate unemployment at about 4 million in January
Before we can arrive at a figure for the labor force that
may be absorbed during 1942 and further additions
and subtractions must be made. In the first place, we believe
that the present total of unemployed includes at least one
million persons who should be classified as unemployable.
This figure, however, will be approximately offset by the
normal increment from the growth of population which
may be estimated with reasonable accuracy for the two years
at something over one million. Second, the armed forces are
likely to absorb an additional 4 million.4 This amounts to
assuming that additions to the armed forces will fully equal
the total unemployed. Net additions to the labor force dur-
ing the next two years will have to come from other sources.
The number likely to be drawn into employment from
the great reservoir of women not heretofore gainfully occu-
pied, and from youths in school and on farms, is difficult to
estimate. According to the 1940 Census, the total population
in the United States between the ages of i6 and 65 was 87.2
million. Subtracting those classified in these age groups as
unable to work, as well as the inmates of institutions, leaves
84.1millionpersons of both sexes. This figure might be
called the maximum potential labor force of the nation and
compares with the Census figure of 50.5 million as the actual
labor force within these age limits. Of the difference, some
million, 26 million were accounted for by women doing
their own housework, and slightly more than 5 million by
youths in school.5
There is no rational method of estimating how large a pro-
portion of this vast labor reserve might be called forth should
the war crisis become very grave, but we can be sure that
the total will tend to vary directly with the intensity of the
crisis. British and Russian experience in 1940 and 1941 shows
what can happen under the pressure of threatened or actualTHE NATIONAL PRODUCT AND ITS COMPOSITION 31
invasion. In the absence of such emergencies, however, the
number called forth is likely to be a relatively small propor-
tion of the total reserve, and will tend to be limited by the
speed and efficiency with which industrial facilities and ma-
terial supplies are expanded to meet military demands. After
weighing these factors, and assuming no serious deterioration
of our strategic position, we estimate that somemillion
workers are likely to be added to the labor force from this
reserve during the next two years, and we accept this as our
estimate of the total additional labor force likely to be
drawn into employment between the beginning of i 942 and
the end of 1943. Accordingly, although the potential labor
reserve is much greater, the reasonable probabilities indicate
that the total employed labor force in 1943 may exceed the
total for 1941 by about 3 million.
If this additional labor force could be employed with con-
comitant gains to the gross national product of the same
average magnitude as that experienced in 1938—41, $5 billion
per million additional workers employed, some billion
would accrue to the billion of gross national product
in 1941, giving a total of approximately $128 billion. This
figure would assume a continuation of the same average re-
lationship as existed when ample time made an orderly
absorption of workers possible, and when shortages of skilled
labor, plant, materials, and transportation were not factors.
Under the stresses of war, a somewhat less favorable rela-
tionship is possible, although the reduction or elimination
of seasonal and certain other let-downs in the rate of
inthe opposite direction. Allowing
for these conflicting tendencies, we believe that a level of
gross national product of about $125 billion may reasonably
be expected if the estimated supply of additional workers is
completely absorbed into industry. We believe, also, that a
higher level of approximately billion is attainable dur-
ing the war, but only under conditions sufficiently favorable
to offset declining efficiency as we approach full utilization,32 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
conditions such as a longer work week for a large part of
the labor force, considerable expansion of plant facilities in
strategic lines, such as steel, rubber, and aluminum, and the
high morale that may be expected in connection with an
all-out military effort.°
These estimates of $125—130billion of gross national prod-
uct, expressed as they are in dollars of 1940 purchasing
power, will be equivalent to proportionately larger amounts
in current dollars to the extent of any general rise in prices
from the 1940 level. Thus, if prices average in a subsequent
year 20 per cent above those of 1940, the gross national
product in current dollars would have to be $150 billion
to be equivalent to the above estimate of $125 billion in
1940 dollars, and $156 billion to be equivalent to our esti-
mate of $130 billion.7
How soon may we expect to attain the maximum levels of
output indicated above? Chapter ipointed out that time
is of the essence for an expansion of national product. It also
made clear that, by autumn 1941, we had already passed
beyond the stage of rapid and easy expansion, and that fur-
ther advance was likely to be progressively slower as material
and labor shortages forced the curtailment of civilian pro-
duction in order that military output might be stepped up.
Since our formal entry into the war, and the consequent
intensification of our military effort, this tendency has be-
come even more pronounced. Paradoxically, the more we
intensify our war effort from this point on, the slower is
likely to be the rise in the national product. The reason is
that a rapid expansion of military output can now be
achieved only at the expense of reducing civilian production,
and the greater the pressure for speed in this direction the
more serious will become the frictions and losses in the
transition process.
On the whole, we believe that the gross national product,
in 1940 dollars, for 1942 will show a considerable rise over
the level of 1941, and will probably reach about $125 bil-THE NATIONAL PRODUCT AND ITS COMPOSITION 33
lion, despite great difficulties and frictions of transition dur-
ing the first half of this period. We believe also that further
gains may be expected in 1943, but we feel that they are
likely to be small, chiefly because of the limitations to fur-
ther expansion of output imposed by our capacity to pro-
duce such essential materials as steel, copper, and aluminum.
In fact, during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1943 the maxi-
mum level of gross national product, estimated above at
between $125 and billion, may be reached.
If the war should last beyond 1943, we may have to cope
with such factors as human exhaustion and declining indus-
trial efficiency from the undermaintenance of plant and
equipment. In other words, we cannot confidently expect
that the national output will remain at 'its maximum level
for any considerable period. The strains and inefficiencies
involved when the economy is operating at such a pitch are
likely to cause a gradual decline in the national product after
a time.
2 COMPOSITION OF THE NATIONAL PRODUCT
In and of itself a projected increase in total output is not
especially significant for our problem. It is equally important
that we know as much as possible about the composition,
the types and amounts of goods and services which make up
this total, and the shifts in the composition likely under the
impact of the war. For example, it will be of great interest,
from the standpoint of civilian consumption, to know what
we may expect during the next few years in such lines as
housing, automobiles, wearing apparel, and foodstuffs; and,
from the standpoint of the army and the navy, what part
of the rising output is to consist of tanks, planes, guns, and
battleships.
Abundant evidence suggests that during 1941 all types
of goods and services were forthcoming in larger volumes.
That is, military output went hand in hand with substantial
increases in practically all lines of production for civilian34 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
use. Between July 1940 and June 1941, production of air-
craft rose 127 per cent, shipbuilding more than 130 per cent.
The draft army was clothed, housed, and equipped with
small arms while substantial progress was made in starting
the production of heavy armaments. Reflecting increased
civilian consumption, department store sales rose i i per cent.
For the first four months of i 941 passenger automobile sales
were 35 per cent and electric refrigerator sales 22 per cent
higher than in the same period of 1940. For the first five
months of 1941 the construction of private residential houses
was 22 per cent above the same period of 1940.
Our ability to meet civilian demand at the same time that
we were greatly enlarging military production was due pri-
marily to the fact that we began our defense effort with
idle men who could be put to work in idle plants. While the
composition of the national product was somewhat altered,
no serious obstruction appeared to the flow of consumer
goods in response to new demands. As already indicated, this
situation began to change in the autumn of 1941 as the
defense program got into high gear. Competition between
defense and civilian needs for strategic materials, skilled
labor, plant facilities, and transportation had clearly reached
a point where our military output could not be rapidly ex-
panded further unless scarce resources were diverted to the
armament industries. Curtailment programs affecting con-
sumer durable goods, such as automobiles, refrigerators, and
washing machines, soon brought this fact home to the con-
sumer.
Before attempting to forecast the probable shifts in the
composition of the national product, we need to understand
its composition during the immediate pre-defense period. As
a benchmark for this purpose, Tables 3-5 give estimates of
the major components in 1939 and 1940. Since the average
level of prices in 1940 was only about 1.5 per cent above
that of 1939,weare justified in regarding these figures as
practically equivalent to figures in 1940 dollars. Before theTHE NATIONAL PRODUCT AND ITS COMPOSITION 35
defense crisis the great bulk of the gross national product
was made up of consumer goods and services (Table 3). In
1939, they constituted 70 per cent, but declined in 1940 to
TABLE 3
Estimated Composition of the National Product, 1939—1940




PRIVATE& SERVICES TION &
CONSUMER GROSS OF ALL CROSSDEPLETION & NET
CALENDARGOODS & CAPITALGOVERN-NATIONAL ALL BUSI-NATIONAL
YEAR FORMATIONMENTS PRODUCT NESS TAXESINCOME
1939 62.0 15.1 88.i 17.3 70.8
1940 66.2 14.6 16.3 97.1 19.8 77.3
SOURCE:Preliminary Estimates of Gross National Product, 1929—41,byMi!-
con Gilbert and R. B. Bangs; Survey of Current Business, May 1942, p. 12,
Tables iand2.
The column for capital formation pertains only to private capital goods.
The column for total government expenditures introduces an element of
expenditure for government capital goods, but the amount is difficult to
determine even in peacetime, and is especially so in wartime. Similarly, the
appropriate estimate of depreciation on government capital goods is difficult
to determine, and Table 5 omits all figures on government capital goods,
both the gross and the net figures (after deduction of depreciation).
The figures for gross national product do not correspond to figures fre-
quently given for gross national income, a term used to specify the national
income before deduction of depreciation and depletion to secure net national
income. They refer rather to a measure of national output which is gross
not only in the sense that no deduction for depreciation and depletion has
been made, but also in the sense that business taxes and certain other items
which come out of the gross product at sales prices before computation of
net national income have been left in. The reason for stating this gross
figure on this basis is that especially in wartime, when government expendi-
tures for armament assume huge proportions, the comparison of such ex-
penditures with measures of net national income, or even of gross national
income, as customarily calculated, overlooks the fact that the prices of mili-
tary goods include certain elements customarily deducted in calculating net
national income and even certain elements not present in gross national in-
come as customarily defined. The column for depreciation and depletion
includes also income credited to other business reserves and capital outlays
charged to current expenses, and a correction for revaluation of business in-
ventories.36 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
68 per cent, although increasing in absolute dollar volume.
Private gross capital formation, on the other hand, increased
from about 12.5 per cent of the total in 1939 to approxi-
mately 15 per cent in 1940, this increase being typical of a
period of rising national output.
Of goods and services produced for consumers, perishable
items, largely food, account for something over 43 per cent;
semidurable commodities, such as clothing, shoes, and house-
hold furnishings, for about 14 per cent; while durable goods,
such as automobiles, refrigerators, and furniture, rose from
11.5 to 12.5 per cent of total consumer goods and services
(Table 4). This rising proportion of durable goods is typical
of a peacetime period of rising output, and the limitations on
our ability to provide this type of commodity in the years
ahead constitute one of our most serious problems.
TABLE 4
Composition of Consumer Goods and Services, and the
Percentage each Category Constitutes of the Total, 1939—1940
CALENDAR
YEAR PERIShABLESEMIDURABLEDURABLE SERVICES TOTAL
Billions of current dollars
1939 26.9 8.g 7.1 19.1 62.0
1940 28.6 9.3 8.3 20.0 66.2
Percentages of total
1939 43.5 14.5 11.5 30.5
1940 43 14 12.5 30.5
SOURCES: for all consumer goods, W. H. Shaw, The Gross Flow of Finished
Commodities and New Construction, 1929—41, Survey of Current Business,
April 1942, p. iG; and ibid., May 1942, Table 2.
Consumer services, a broad category covering personal
services (dressmakers, laundries, cleaning and pressing agen-
cies, etc.), home services (residential rents, domestic service,
utilities), education and religion, medical, transportation,
and recreation services, represented about 30 per cent ofTHE NATIONAL PRODUCT AND ITS COMPOSITION 37
total goods and services in these years, and ordinarily tend to
rise with output.
The private capital goods component of the gross national
product must inevitably undergo substantial changes during
the war. Of total private capital goods produced in 1940
(before provision for depreciation and depletion), approxi-
mately 6o per cent were accounted for by private business
and 15 per cent by residential construction (Table 5).
.2
TABLE5
Composition of Private Capital Goods, 1939—1940




tion & tion &
GrossDepletionNet GrossDepletion Net
1)Businessplant
and equipment 7.0 6.4 o.6 8.7 6.5 2.2
2) Net increase in in-
ventories i.i 1.1 1.9 1.9
Residential con-
struction 2.1 2.2 —0.1 2.3 2.5 —0.2
4)Net addition to
claims against
foreign countrieso.8 o.8 1.4 1.4
5)Domestic purchases
of monetary metalso.o 0.0 0.3 0.3
Total 11.0 8.6 2.4 14.6 g.o 5.6
souRcEs: Survey of Current Business, May 1942, p. The Anatomy of
Public Spending, Part II, Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Fortune, June 1942, p. 132.
Expected Changes in Composition
If 1942 and 1943 were to be an ordinary peacetime period of
rising output, we could expect no other kinds of change in
the composition of real income than have occurred in similar
periods in the past. Goods and services for consumers could
be expected to increase absolutely but decline as a percentage
of the total, while capital goods could be expected to increase
both absolutely and relatively. Such usual relationships, how-B8 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
ever, are certain to be radically altered by the impact of
the total war in which we are engaged. In the ensuing pages
we analyze the major shifts likely to occur during 1942 and
1943 in the composition of the national product.
a) Perishable Goods: Foods
On the whole, the outlook for food supplies in 1942—43 is
favorable, and for 1942 at least, food production should be
ample to supply both domestic and export requirements.
Although moderate shortages may develop in certain special
lines, these should be offset by our tremendous capacity for
producing many staple foodstuffs.
TABLE 6
Estimated 1941 Production, Expected 1942 Production,
and Percentage Increase for Selected Food Crops
1941EST. 1942GOAL % INCREASE
Milk (million lbs.) 116,500 125,000 7.0
Hogs (millions) 72.5 83 14
Cattle and calves (millions) 25.9 28 8
Chickens (millions) 582 644 10
Eggs (million doz.) P3,728 4,000 13
souRcE: U. S. Department of Agriculture press release, Jan. i6, 1942.
Table 6 suggests the extent to which the supplies of certain
basic food products are expected to increase in 1942 over
the high levels of 1941. Milk production is expected to gain
7 per cent, from under '17 billion to 125 billion pounds,
which, it is thought, will be adequate for both the enlarged
domestic and Lend-Lease consumption of dairy products.
Chickens and eggs are estimated to gain some io and 13 per
cent respectively. Although supplies may not be entirely
adequate, livestock production is expected to increase. Hog
production for 1942 is estimated at almost 14 per cent above
1941, while cattle and calves are expected to be up about
8 per cent.
Cereal supplies as a whole should be ample. AlthoughTHE NATIONAL PRODUCT AND ITS COMPOSITION
1942 winter wheat production was estimated on June io,
1942 at only 647 million bushels, whereas 1941 production
was about 68o million bushels, the carryover of wheat in the
United States on July i, 1942 is estimated at the record total
of 630 million bushels.8
Vegetables should be in substantially larger volume in
1942 than in 1941, while domestic fruits, production of
which cannot be expanded quickly, will doubtless have to be
supplemented by imports.
A real stringency was already evident by spring 1942 in
our sugar suppIies. Our usual supply from the Philippine
Islands had been eliminated for 1942, we were having serious
difficulty in importing sugar from Hawaii, and the submarine
menace was reducing imports even from nearby Cuba.
Beyond 1942 the outlook for food supplies seems some-
what less favorable. We shall probably be called upon to
satisfy an increasing demand from Great Britain because of
shipping difficulties in bringing supplies from more remote
sources. In addition, if our military outlays reach half of
the gross national product, we are likely to experience a
shortage of agricultural labor. Although our supply of food-
stuffs as a whole in 1943 is not likely to fall much below the
level of 1940, moderate stringencies are expected in some
meats, dairy products, sugar, and fruits. Demand for these
semi-luxury items tends to increase more rapidly than that
for staple foodstuffs in periods of rising output.
b) Semidurable Goods: Wearing Apparel
The outlook for clothing supplies and those of other semi-
durable goods, while definitely favorable for some important
items, presents a very mixed picture on the whole. In the
first place, there should be little difficulty in supplying the
expanded demand for cotton goods indicated by our esti-
mates. Even though domestic consumption of raw cotton has
been running at the record rate of 10.5 million bales annu-
ally, little ground exists for fearing a shortage. Production is40 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
still sufficient at least to balance the current high rate of
consumption, and the carryover at the end of 1941.amounted
to more than a year's supply. Facilities for handling and
processing the larger volume of raw cotton seem adequate.
The outlook for woolen goods is much less encouraging.
In 1941, a year of high activity, we produced only about one-
half of our domestic needs for apparel wool, importing the
balance from Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and
South America. Since our processing facilities seem fully
adequate, the prospective shortage of woolen goods turns
largely on shipping facilities. The progressive shortage of
ships is reducing our foreign supplies of raw wool, partic-
ularly since most of the sources are far distant. The war in the
Pacific may cut off entirely our chief foreign sources, Aus-
tralia and New Zealand. This condition will be aggravated.,
as far as civilian consumption is concerned, by the great de-
mands of the armed forces for woolen goods.
Shipping is also the decisive factor for shoes and leather
goods. In 1941 only about two-thirds of our requirements for
bides were supplied domestically; the balance was imported
from South America. Although some stringency is likely in
shoes and leather goods, it will become serious only if the
submarine menace in the Atlantic should cut off our access
to South American sources.
The war in the Pacific has brought us face to face with
acute shortages in rubber and silk. The chief former source
of our rubber was in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, now
overrun by Japan, and less than eight months' supply was
on hand in the United States at the end of 1941.Almost
immediately after we entered the war, domestic production
of tires for passenger automobiles was sharply curtailed.
\'Vith military needs for rubber rising steadily, civilian uses
have been drastically restricted, and substitute materials are
certain to prove inadequate to bridge the gap. Practically
our sole source of silk, Japan, was virtually cut off some
time before the war started. Because of war requirementsTHE NATIONAL PRODUCT AND ITS COMPOSITION 41
for silk in the manufacture of parachutes and powder bags,
civilian consumption has been virtually eliminated. The silk
shortage, however, should not prove nearly as serious as
that in rubber because of our large domestic capacity to
produce rayon and other substitutes.
In summary, we see a likelihood of some real stringencies
in certain important lines of consumer semidurable goods,
such as wool, silk, rubber, and possibly leather. The extent
will be closely correlated with the tightness of the shipping
situation the progress of the war in the Pacific. For the
class as a whole, progressive curtailment seems likely in
1942. In i 943 aggregate civilian consumption be as low
as $7-8 billion in 1940dollars,.compared with about $11
billionin 1941. Moreover, many plants producing luxury
or non-essential items may be closed in order to release work-
ers for war industries.
c) Consumer Durable Goods
Under ordinary conditions of rising output, as shown in
Table 5, production of consumer durable goods tends to
rise conspicuously to satisfy the greater demand. During the
war this category is certain to suffer a drastic curtailment.
Production of automobiles, refrigerators, and washing ma-
chines means competition for materials, such as steel, zinc,
aluminum, copper, tin, glass, and rubber, for skilled workers,
and for mechanical facilities, all of which can be devoted
directly to arms production. In 1940 automobiles alone
(including spare parts and accessories) consumed i6 per cent
of steel output, 51 per cent of malleable iron, 8o per cent
of crude rubber, 1per cent of copper, and i 2 per cent of
tin.
Even before we entered the war, it had become evident
that almost all kinds of consumer durable goods would have
to be drastically curtailed if military output were to be ex-
panded further. Progressively lower quotas for passenger
automobiles, put into effect in autumn 1941, were intended42 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
to restrict production of 1942 models to approximately half
of the totals produced in the 1941 model year. Similar re-
strictions were placed on the production of refrigerators,
washing machines, and radios. Early in 1942 production
passenger automobiles and of many other durable goods was
stopped entirely and we can expect this trend to become
more and more accentuated.
We can expect declines far below the total of about $io
billion registered by this category in 1941, and in 1942 and
1943 the total will probably not amount to more than $2-3
billion annually. Operation of automobiles is almost certain
to decline °markedly because of inability to replace worn-out
cars, the acute shortage of tires, and shortages of gasoline
in certain areas because of transportation difficulties.
This curtailment will, however, come after the unusually
high levels of production reached in 1941. During the first
nine months of 1941notonly was deferred demand in most
of these lines substantially filled but also considerable for-
ward buying occurred in anticipation of future shortages.
For example, refrigerator sales totaled overmillion units
compared with about 2.8 million for all 1940; sales of electric
ranges totaled over 500,000 unitscomparedwith 38o,ooo
for all i 940; sales of washing machines and vacuum cleaners
gained approximately 40 per cent over the same period in
1940. Production of automobiles and trucks in the first nine
months of J941totaled4,031,000UfljtS,10 again of about
22 per cent over the same period in. 1940.Withthe exception
of automobiles, the use of which will be severely restricted
by rubber and gasoline shortages, any widespread civilian
shortages of these facilities will tend to be minimized during
the next year or two.
d) Consumer Services
This category ordinarily expands with a rise in output, as is
suggested in Table 4. People have more funds with which
to command better housing accommodations, more trans-THE NATIONAL PRODUCT AND ITS COMPOSITION 43
portation and utility services, more amusements, doctors,
tailors, lawyers, etc. During the war, however, this class as
a whole should show a moderate but progressive decline,
although our military effort should not mean a substantial
diversion of resources from it. Stringencies will develop in
some areas as the armed forces require more doctors and
dentists, as the transportation and utility systems become
increasingly burdened, and as domestic servants go into
factory employment. As a result of the increasing shortage of
labor, some curtailment is also likely in amusement indus-
tries as well as in various personal service industries, such
as barber shops, beauty shops, laundries, and cleaning estab-
lishments.
e) Capital Goods
A rising national output is usually associated with a rela-
tively greater expansion of capital goods than the rise in
total output, as is indicated in Table 5. Thus, net additions
to private capital goods rose from $2.4 billion in 1939 to
$5.6 billion in 1940, a gain of about per cent.
These figures refer to net additions to capital goods, a total
derived by deducting from gross capital formation the de-
preciation and depletion accrued or imputed in a given year.
The actual amount of private capital goods produced in
any year exceeds net additions by the allowance for deprecia-
tion and depletion. For the purposes of this analysis, the
gross amount of private capital goods, rather than net addi-
tions, is the really significant total, because it shows the
actual volume of physical installations, while allowances for
depreciation and depletion are simply bookkeeping deduc-
tions to enable us to estimate the annual net increment to
our stock of physical capital. As set forth in Table 5, the
gross volume of private capital goods in 1940 amounted to
$14.6 billion, and deductions for depreciation and depletion
to $9.0 billion, leaving $5.6 billion for net additions to
private capital goods. The reader should also be reminded44 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
that the totals in Table5 are for private capital formation
alone, and therefore exclude government capital formation.
Thus, the enormous outlays by the federal government for
armament plants and other capital items are treated in this
analysis as military expenditures, not as capital goods items.
In contrast to the large increase from 1939to1941,the
private capital goods category is certain to decline sharply
during 1942 and despite very substantial additions for
defense purposes. Sharp curtailments will be inevitable in
the availability of machine tools, structural steel and other
building materials, skilled labor and transportation facilities
for the construction of residential buildings, business plants
and equipment, bridges, schools, etc., except to the extent
that 'such construction is deemed essential for war purposes.
As a result of the tremendous increase in defense plant
additions and other military construction, gross capital addi-
tions are estimated to have expanded to approximately $i8
billion in 1941 compared with $14.6billionin 1940. Gross
additions to plant and equipment for private business were
estimated at $8.7 billion for 1940 (Table 5). The total for
1941 is estimated at about $11.4 billion as a result of the
substantial increase in additions for defense activities. In
1942 the total should continue large because the enormous
program of war plant expansion is still uncompleted. On
the other hand, plant and equipment for non-defense indus-
tries will be curtailed sharply as pressure to supply armament
needs becomes greater on the machine tool industries, steel,
and other lines. In 1943,withthe war effort at a peak and
with the armament plant program largely completed, total
gross additions to private business plant and equipment for
all purposes should decline sharply, and will probably amount
to not more than one-half of the total for 1940.
Notonly will non-defense industries find it impossible
to make net additions to plant and equipment, but they
will also be forced to postpone most of their normal replace-
ments of old plants and machinery. Such postponement ofTHE NATIONAL PRODUCT AND ITS COMPOSITION 45
replacements, or undermaintenance of capital, releases re-
sources to the war effort. For example, if the machinery in
a factory, a part of which normally would have been replaced
111 1942, is made to operate a year or two longer, resources
in the machine tool industry are freed to provide equipment
for turning out machine guns, tanks, or airplanes. As pointed
out in Chapter 1, this is one of the few methods by which
we can borrow from the future. When the armament pro-
gram hits its full stride, the undermaintenance of capital in
non-military lines will probably be at least equal to net
capital additions in war industries; there will be no net
capital additions for private industry as a whole, and there
will probably be a substantial net decline.
Gross residential construction in 1940 was placed at $2.3
billion, or slightly less than the imputed allowance for de-
preciation. In 1941 it is estimated at $2.7 billion, showing
a moderate increase over 1940. During the last few months
of i 941, however, the of priority rulings had al-
ready checked new private cons'truction. In 1942 gross resi-
dential construction is expected to decline progressively as
private projects are completed. In 1943 total privately fi-
nanced residential construction for all purposes other than
necessary repairs and maintenance should be extremely small.
Another item of business investment is inventory accumu-
lation, or the net increase in business inventories from one
year to the next. In 1940, it was $1.9billionand is estimated
at $3.9 billion in 1941. Under the pressure of increasing
shortages and of tighter governmental controls in 1942, how-
ever, inventory accumulation will undoubtedly slow down
and may actually become negative. In 1943 the depletion of
business .inventories should be substantial and become a sig-
nificant negative figure in the capital goods component. Net
foreign claims, exclusive of Lend-Lease claims, will also de-
cline and probably become negative in 1942 and 1943, since
imports are likely to rise to ease domestic shortages, and46 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
since an increasing proportion of our exports will consist
.of Lend-Lease shipments.
The capital goods items considered above, private business
plant and equipment, residential construction, inventory
accumulation, net foreign claims, should all decline pro-
gressively and substantially throughout the war. As a rough
estimate, we believe that total gross private capital additions
in 1942 may not exceed $io billion. This would about equal
estimated depreciation and depletion. We roughly estimate
gross private capital additions in 1943 at not more than
$3 billion, which would mean net capital consumption, or
undermaintenance, of about $7 billion, after deducting esti-
mated depreciation and depletion.
Summary of Outlook for the Composition of the National
Product
Shifts in the composition of the national product during
1942 and 1943 will reflect the diversion of resources to mili-
tary needs. Once past the early stages of rearmament we
cannot have both guns and all the butter we want. When
war production reaches the magnitudes indicated for 1942
and 1943, mechanical facilities and skilled workers are certain
to be inadequate for both, and non-military output will have
to decline.
As suggested in the preceding chapter, we believe that
military outlays in 1943maybe as high as half of the gross
national product. The current rate of military expenditures
indicates that military outlays in 1942 are likely to be about
$50 billion. This would mean in 1940 dollars about
billion or 34 per cent of an estimated gross national product
of $125 billion for 1942. For 1943 WC estimate military ex-
penditures at roughly $6i billion, in 1940 dollars,nearly
50 per cent of an estimated gross national product of $128
billion.
In this chapter, we have analyzed in some detail the proba-
ble shifts in the composition of the national product whichTHE NATIONAL PRODUCT AND ITS COMPOSITION 47
may be expected as a result of such military expenditures,
and have indicated the corresponding civilian sacrifices. In
Table 7 the results of this analysis are summarized. Using
Department of Commerce estimates for 1940 and 1941 as a
base, we have projected these estimates for 1942 and 1943,
TABLE 7
Estimated Composition of the Gross National Product,
1940—1943 (billions of 1940 dollars)
CALENDAR YEAR
1940 1941 1942 1943
Civilianconsumer goods & services
Perishable 29 32 29. 27
Semidurable 9 9 7
Durable 8 10 3 2
Services 20 19 17
Total 6& 72 59 53
Private gross capital formation 15 i8 10 3
Total purchases of non-military goods & serv-
ices by all governments 13.5 13 13 11
Military outlays 3 10.5 43
Gross national product 97.5 113.5 125 128
SOuRCE: Survey of Current Business, April and May 1942. Figures for 1942
and 1943 are our own estimates, based upon figures available to date.
on the assumption of levels for gross national product and
military outlays as indicated above. These estimates are not
intended to be precise forecasts but, because of the many
variables involved, should be considered merely as rough
approximations of what may be expected within the limits
suggested for gross national product and military expendi-
tures.
As we have already seen, food supplies should be reasonably
adequate for domestic consumption, despite stringencies in
certain lines. Supplies as a whole in 1942 should be about
equal to the 1940 level, although about io per cent less than
the high level of 1941. A further moderate decline may be
expected in 1943. The expected curtailment in wearing ap-
parel and other semidurable goods is considerably more, be-48 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
cause of actual and prospective shortages of many important
materials, such as wool, silk, rubber, and leather. In 1943
it may amount to as much as35 per cent from the 1941level.
The most drastic curtailment in consumer goods will be
among durables, and the total available for the civilian popu-
lation may not be more than 20 toper cent of the 1941
volume. New automobiles, refrigerators, washing machines,
radios, etc., for civilian use are likely to be almost non-
existent. Consumer services are expected to decline gradually
but steadily, as the labor shortage draws workers away from
non-essential services, and as our transportation and utility
systems become overburdened.
Considering consumer goods and services as a whole, we
estimate that the volume available for civilian use may de-
cline as much as i8 per cent in 1942, and as much as 26 per
cent in 1943, from the 1941 level. Since everyone will have
plenty to eat and reasonably satisfactory supplies of clothing,
we do not expect much actual civilian suffering from the
greater curtailments in other less essential lines.
Total capital formation, exclusive of government financed
capital additions for military purposes, will decline markedly
during the next two years. Fortunately, however, this also is
an area in which substantial curtailments can be made with-
out causing much actual civilian suffering. We estimate that
gross private capital formation in 1942 will be little, if any,
above the annual accruals for depreciation and depletion;
in 1943 we believe it will be about one-third the 1942 total,
and about one-sixth that of 1941. This will mean a sub-
stantial consumption, or undermaintenance, of our capital
stock, which may amount to $7billionor more.
We believe these estimates represent the minimum, rather
than the maximum, of civilian curtailments which may be
expected if our military outlays reach the levels indicated.
If gross national product should rise to $i 30 billion or more
in 1943 instead of the estimated $128 billion, most of the
increment would undoubtedly consist of military goods. If,THE NATIONAL PRODUCT AND ITS COMPOSITION 49
however, the national product should be less than $128bil-
lion, as is entirely possible, further declines in civilian con-
sumption could be expected rather than any curtailment of
our military program.
Finally, Table 7 shows clearly the sources from which the
increase of $58 billion in our military outlays from the total
ofbillionin 1940 to the assumed level of $6i billion in
1943 may be derived. Of this gain, billion should come
from actual expansion in the gross national product, $13
billion from reduced civilian consumption, $12 billion from
curtailed private capital formation, and $2-3 billion from a
reduction in federal non-military outlays.
NOTES
1Theaverage relationship was found by fitting a straight line to the two
series: employment as represented by annual averages of the monthly em-
ployment figures published by the National Industrial Conference Board, and
the gross national product as represented by the Department of Commerce
series (Survey of Current Business, May 1942)adjustedto constant dollars,
here the average of 1935—39.Pricesin 1940averagedthe same as 1935—39.
2 AlvinH. Hansen has estimated an average of g million unemployed in
1940(Reviewof Economic Statistics,Feb.1941,p.i).J.P. Wernette's esti-
mate of the total unemployed in the spring of 1940wasalso 9 million (Har-
vard Business Review, Spring 1941,p.288). The preliminary Census report
of March 1940indicateda total of 8 million, while 8.5 million is reached by
subtracting total average employment in 1940ofabout 46.5 million, as esti-
mated by the National Industrial Conference Board, from the total labor
force in 1940ofaboutmillion, as estimated by the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics (Journal of the American Statistical Association,June'94', pp. 167-8).
3TheWork Projects Administration estimated total unemployment in De-
cember 1941at3.8 million.
4Atthe end of our armed forces totaled slightly more than 2million
men. In view of the worldwide struggle, it seems reasonable to assume that
thistotal will reach at least 6 million before a successful conclusion is
achieved. The ultimate total, of course, will depend to a considerable extent
upon what course the war takes, and it is easily conceivable that our armed
forces may greatly exceed 6 million.
5Bureauof the Census, Series.P-4, No. 8, press release, Nov. 21,1941.
6 Thecurrent shortage of rubber may soon prove to be a restrictive influence
of great importance on a further rise in national output. Our national
omy has become so dependent upon transportation by trucks, busses, andFISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
passenger automobiles that it is difficult to imagine what the effects will be
whenthecivilian supply of tires wears out and cannot be replaced. We can
be certain, however, that they will be serious. Delivery of manufacturing
supplies and equipment is likely to be markedly delayed as the carrying
capacity of our railroads becomes overtaxed, the efficiency of our labor force
may be reduced as getting to and from work becomes more difficult, and
other maladjustments appear. In fact, it is easy to conceive that the tempo of
our entire industrial organization may be greatly retarded by this one factor
alone.
Gross national product in 1941,asestimated by the Department of Com-
merce in current dollars, amounted to $i19.7 billion(equivalent to about
$it3 billion in dollars).
KNew York Times, June 27, 1942.
9Ibid., Sept. 28, 1941,p.F-5.
10 Ward's Automotive Nov.
S